Sharing IT resources within and between organizations has an attractive value proposition in terms of efficiency and flexibility, but despite this commercial practice is limited. In contrast, financial and commodity markets have proved very successful at dynamic allocation of different resource types to many different organizations. Thus to understand how the potential benefits of sharing IT resources may be promoted in practice we analyze enabling factors in successful markets. We present 10 basic lessons for IT resource sharing derived from a financial perspective and modified by considering the nature and context of IT resources. From each lesson we derive the required software or process capability required to support it. We then evaluate the maturity of the respective capabilities within the Peer to Peer (P2P) and Grid environments using a simple framework based on the standard Capability Maturity Model (CMM) approach. We conclude with a description of the largest capability gaps and the lowest hanging fruit for making IT resource sharing a viable business proposition in many organizations.
Introduction
Sharing IT resources within and between companies has an attractive value proposition for many organizations in terms of efficiency and flexibility, but despite this commercial practice is limited. What we are considering is large scale resource sharing between separate budget entities, for example within a large lifesciences company, an oil company or a financial institution, or indeed, between them. Common technical paradigms for enabling resource sharing have appeared in terms of the peer-to-peer (P2P), cycle-harvesting, and more generally the whole Grid movement. Whilst the value proposition for resource sharing may be compelling in the abstract, sharing is still at a rudimentary stage in practice.
Business executives and IS managers would clearly welcome the possibility to extract more value out of available resources, especially in light of shrinking IT budgets. However, evidence of slow adoption suggests that many of them are not yet convinced these new sharing paradigms can deliver in practice. Technically §Now with McKinsey & Company, Business Technology Office, Alpenstrasse 3, 8065 Zurich, Switzerland. Contact at: georgios cheliotis@mckinsey.com it is indeed possible to allocate resources at need and change this allocation on very short time-scales. However, dynamic alignment with changing business objectives is largely absent so the ability to execute on a business proposition is limited. This is the principal reason for the slow commercial adoption of P2P and related technologies. They do enable sharing, but they don't help an organization decide how to best allocate the resources it owns. In contrast, financial and commodity markets have proved very successful in practice both in scale and scope for the dynamic sharing and allocation of many different types of resources between many organizations. Thus to understand how the potential benefits of sharing IT resources may be realized in practice we consider lessons that a financial perspective brings.
In this chapter we present 10 basic lessons for enabling large scale commercial resource sharing derived from understanding how conventional resource allocation works in situations that are commercial, large scale, highly flexible and dynamic, i.e. financial and commodity exchanges. From each lesson we derive one or more software or process capabilities required to support it. We then evaluate the maturity of the respective capabilities within the P2P and Grid environments using a simple framework based on the standard Capability Maturity Model (CMM) approach [Ins] . We do not claim that these lessons and respective capabilities are exhaustive and definitive but rather that they have been fundamental for enabling commercial efficiency and flexibility in other resource sharing environments. Thus these lessons are worthy of serious consideration by executives, organizations and engineers who aim to promote efficient and flexible usage and sharing of IT resources in a commercial context.
Grid, P2P and Cycle-Harvesting:
Three Converging Paradigms
Resource sharing can be implemented in many different ways and several technical approaches with their own communities, literature, software, etc., have appeared. We recognize three main movements, Grid computing, P2P and cycle-harvesting. There are large areas of overlap, but given that all three terms are frequently used to describe similar but not identical technologies, we briefly discuss and compare them to set the stage for the rest of the chapter. We present a summary of this high-level comparison in Table 1 . We compare resource sharing paradigms according to the following categories: organization; function; enabling technology; user expectations; user sophistication; access requirements; commercialization of enabling technology and of relevant resources. The category that deservers particular comment in the context of this chapter is commercialization. Other categories serve to illustrate that these technologies may be different, but in essence refer and lead to the same objective, i.e. large-scale resource sharing.
Under commercialization, we refer to the commercial success of companies selling the enabling technology and companies selling the resources themselves (internally or externally). Whilst some P2P software is or has been pervasive, e.g. Napster or Kazaa, the business success of the companies supporting the software is less clear. In contrast there are many companies successfully selling Grid and cycle-harvesting software or with a significant services business around these technologies, e.g. Platform Computing, Entropia, United Devices, Sun, IBM and others. In terms of sales of the resources themselves for money there are some company internal examples in the Grid space (although we cannot cite company names at this point). There have been a number of attempts to commercialize resources on a P2P or cycle-harvesting basis but we are unaware of any significant successes.
From the comparisons in Table 1 it is clear that in terms of delivering resource sharing capabilities P2P and cycle-harvesting are functional subsets of the Grid paradigm although they do not usually share the Global Grid Forum's technical standards at this point. The paradigms are often directed towards different market segments and there is little technical commonality in their most successful implementations (e.g. content sharing for P2P versus cpu/storage use by applications for Grid). However the high level business propositions are basically the same and we can expect the functionality to merge with increasing commercial interest and further standardization. It follows that the 10 lessons we discuss are relevant for all three sharing paradigms
10 Lessons from Finance
In this section we describe each of the 10 lessons and the capability required to derive the benefit from each. In the following section we assess the maturity of the respective capabilities in IT sharing systems.
Avoid the tragedy of the commons
Usage increases whenever there is an increased need, i.e. when the marginal benefit to the user of utilizing an extra unit exceeds the cost of consuming that unit. In an uncontrolled or free-for-all situation this marginal cost is very low. This is especially true in the This socioeconomic phenomenon whereby the individually "rational" actions of members of a population have a negative impact on the entire population is often called "the tragedy of the commons" (see Figure  1) .
Common recipes for dealing with this issue target the internalization of negative externalities into every individual's decision process. This can be achieved by taxation, regulation (e.g. TCP congestion control), private solutions or prices for access rights, e.g. permits.
Shared IT infrastructure is particularly prone to negative externalities because there is currently no scalable and dynamic standard mechanism for limiting system (ab)use. Local priority rules are efficient only in returning Grids to their pre-Grid, i.e. non-shared, state whilst free-access spaces suffer from the Tragedy of the Commons. Static policies are particularly inappropriate for dynamic Virtual Organizations and do not scale well as the number of participating entities increase. Pricing access to IT resources and permitting resale is a direct and scalable way to preclude such a tragedy of the commons for Grid deployments that deserves serious consideration.
Discover dynamic value
Given even the most cursory awareness of conventional resources and commodities such as copper, electricity and petrol (gas) it is clear that resource value at the wholesale level is dynamic. What is perhaps less clear to some casual observers is that resources on Grids have dynamic value.
Value derives from a combination of need and scarcity. User needs are not constant, they change over time and the changes also depend on the timescale and granularity of observation. During a project lifecycle a single user working on that project will have varying workloads in different phases of development. The number of projects that a user is involved in also changes with time. Needs are also driven by external and irregular events, e.g. reaction to advertising campaigns, seasonality, request-for-bids that require data analysis.
Variations in user needs change resource value very little if the resources are not scarce, i.e. if the capacity of the shared infrastructure is never exhausted. However this happy state is rarely present for users with computationally heavy applications.
After recognizing that the value of any given resource changes with time, the obvious question is how to discover this dynamic value at any point in time. One approach is to use a dynamic "price formation" mechanism. The mapping of needs to prices, price formation, has no single solution but there is an extensive body of work precisely on this topic: auctions [Kle99] . Whilst prices must be fed back to users (see next lesson), there is no corresponding need for the price formation mechanism to be visible to users. This can be handled for the most part by automated software: but a mechanism is still required and there are significant design challenges for it.
The lesson from auction theory and practice is that effective price discovery is difficult: the choice of price formation mechanism can either promote market efficiency or hamper it. Generally it is difficult to achieve a balance between the needs of producers and consumers. Recent examples that illustrate this difficulty very well are the 3G mobile telephony spectrum auctions [Kle02, Wol] .
High profile auctions for 3G licenses have been carried out in many European countries. Two distinct problems arose in these auctions: bidder busts ("winner's curse") and auctioneer flops. 3G auctions in Germany and the UK yielded enormous profits for the local authorities at the expense of the bidders, whereas in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria prices remained well below expectations, disappointing the respective auctioneers.
In IT resource sharing we want to avoid the win-ner's curse, also resources are perishable (capacity not used now is worthless in the next moment), needs are dynamic and applications require bundles with multiple units of items (CPU, RAM, permanent storage, network bandwidth). With these conditions in mind, potentially suitable auction models for IT resources include continuous double auctions, Vickrey, Dutch, multi-unit and multi-item (or combinatorial) auctions. However, individually these approaches alone do not offer a comprehensive and precise price formation solution. The optimality of an auction mechanism will always depend on the particular deployment environment, there are no one-size-fits-all solutions.
Communicate dynamic value
A further issue is whether this dynamic value, i.e. price, should be communicated to users, or whether it should only be used internally by the resource sharing system to produce allocations of resources to users. Perhaps users (or their respective managers) should only pay a fixed subscription fee for accessing a shared resource space? Isolating users from price dynamics makes sense when they never see, or cause, scarcity, i.e. when they have low and uncorrelated needs. For example bread price dynamics at supermarkets have little relation to corn futures markets. On the other hand electricity companies seek methods to pass intra-day price dynamics on to consumers because of the enormous loads consumers produce through correlated responses to events (e.g. extremes of temperature) even though each individual consumes little relative to the capacity of an electricity generator.
Most users of Grid infrastructures are heavy resource consumers almost by definition so dynamic prices must be communicated at some level. Fixed pricing may only make sense in a limited number of cases, e.g. in pure P2P file sharing environment with a large population of uncorrelated user demands.
Use real money
An issue which concerns the Grid community is the definition of a Grid currency. The issue is generally more important for commercial IT sharing environments than for earlier distributed systems because the former usually cross budget boundaries. In addition managers will face the issue of whether to buy resources on accessible shared spaces or boxes, and also whether to make their boxes available to the shared spaces to which their organization is linked.
Shared IT resources are typically heterogeneous and potentially of arbitrary scale. Scale and heterogeneity are exactly the drivers which led to the establishment of standard monetary units and currency exchange rates in the real economy.
The administration of a particular shared space may choose to introduce prices for a local artificial currency. The administration must then act as a national bank guaranteeing the convertibility of the currency into units of value, i.e. resources or real money. Now who sets the exchange rates and to which unit of value? A currency board? A fixed exchange rate?
IT administrations should quickly choose to skip the intermediate step of an artificial currency with its trust and convertibility problems and use real money straight away. Using a real currency for shared resources additionally brings the following benefits: buy/build/lease or upgrade/retire decisions are simplified and the allocation of IT budgets is directly meaningful.
Guarantee property rights
What Quality of Service (QoS) is required for tradeable value? Most IT systems today do not support hard QoS guarantees, that is they do not guarantee those properties of a service which influence user experience. Often best-effort service is provided. Approaches which go beyond best-effort typically introduce job/packet marking so that different priorities can be assigned to different tasks [BEP + 96, FH98]. How much better the service will be for differentiated service classes is generally hard to determine in advance for large-scale heterogeneous systems and even harder to characterize in absolute terms. Despite the difficulties of guaranteeing QoS (especially end-to-end), commercialization of shared IT resources requires guaranteed property rights at the level at which pricing is done. Best-effort service has nearzero economic value. In fact the value would be exactly zero if it were not for the assumption that there is a common understanding between the buyer and seller of the service on the quality level to be delivered (see Figure 2) .
Advocates of IT resource sharing envision dynamic near-real-time negotiation and provisioning of distributed resources. A vision that may appear very ambitious at first sight, but is actually very similar to existing financial and commodity markets. Such markets typically operate at electronic speed and rely on the use of extremely detailed processes and contracts to determine the allocations of large, heterogeneous sets of resources to an equally large and heterogeneous population of users. Complexity is no barrier to value for a good. The definitions of some resources traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) run for many pages and even then reference external tests and standards [CMEa, CMEb] .
Computers and applications may be complex but they also have unambiguous definitions. A high level of detail in contract specifications and a hard guarantee on these specifications are necessary elements to create the appropriate confidence among users of a highly distributed cross-organizational system that what they get is exactly what they expected to receive. In some cases a tradable asset must be described in statistical terms, but it is still feasible to provide hard guarantees in this sense. This has been applied to cycle-harvesting [KC03] .
Use futures markets
IT resources are generally not storable, in the sense that capacity not used today cannot be put aside for future use. Since the resources cannot be stored there need be no link between the price for a resource now and the price that the resource (if available) will fetch at any future time (including in 1 second!). Given that it is impossible to build up inventories to smooth out the differences in supply and demand, prices can be arbitrarily volatile (this has been observed in practice for other non-storable commodities). To avoid this price volatility and to enable planning and risk management conventional non-storable commodities have developed futures markets, i.e. markets for reservations.
The most significant non-IT commodity which is also non-storable is electrical power (with the notable exceptions of hydroelectric and pumped storage).
In electricity markets, as in several others for nonstorables (e.g. live cattle, interest rates), contracts for future delivery (forward or futures contracts) are the most used and have much higher trading volumes than those for immediate delivery (spot contracts). The notable electricity market failure in California was directly tied to poor use of forward contracts [ISO02] . See [Hul03] for an introduction to futures markets.
Practical Grid markets will revolve around reservations (forwards or futures) not spot markets. The experience of electricity markets is clear (e.g. California, UK) and has led to their redesign with the aim to move everything possible off the spot market and onto the futures markets. The fact that there is work within the GGF for supporting advance reservations is encouraging [RS02] (see also Figure 3 ) since this capability is vital in commercial practice for non-storable commodities.
Create incentives
In the period 1999-2001 over 1000 new internet based B2B exchanges were set up (according to IDC). Almost all failed. These did not fail because markets have poor theoretical properties, but because their specific value proposition was unconvincing. This was made manifest in "low liquidity", i.e. no activity.
The success stories in B2B markets are mostly in procurement, for very large companies, and specialized national or regional exchanges for electricity. These have one thing in common: force not persuasion to get people to sign up. Some of the results may be good for everyone, but the startup adoption costs must still be paid. The other area of outstanding B2B exchange success is the traditional financial and commodity markets with their vast turnover.
Where does IT sharing and exchange fit into this spectrum of experience? It is outside the scope of this article to answer in detail but certainly the value proposition of cost savings and greater flexibility is generally accepted. Commoditization is also accepted: there are many fewer computer flavors than there are different companies on, say, the New York Stock Exchange.
A company can decide to migrate to an internal market in the same way that it can decide to outsource. This is an executive decision to be made on business grounds: units may protest for whatever reason but the needs of the business are the deciding factor.
Public Grid exchanges are unlikely in the short to medium term because of complexity of implementation and of the required changes in business processes. Within a single company, or a closed group, the prospects for having appropriate incentives to overcome the startup costs and general inertia are much higher.
From the examples above it is clear that practical incentives are vital to promote resource sharing and that incentives are a meta-capability. That is, softwares and systems can support incentive mechanisms but incentive design occurs at a higher business level: the strategic level.
Ensure trust
What is a good trust model for IT resource sharing? We note that trust is different from security and we are concerned here with trust. Security is just one enabler of trust (see Figure 4) . A good trust model for an online bookstore is not the same as a good trust model for a financial exchange. In fact online bookstores effectively outsource their trust model to credit card companies for the most part. All the bookstore has to do is provide a basic level of security.
A financial exchange such as the CME has a more complex trust model. Firstly, all transactions on the exchange between different parties are guaranteed by the exchange not by the individual parties. Thus the traders only need to trust the exchange to do business, not each other. On the other hand the exchange trusts the traders because it monitors their actions and requires them to provide a (cash-equivalent) deposit which is a function of the risk that each trader represents to the exchange for default. That is, the exchange trusts the traders because it has their money. All other people wishing to trade must do so via the traders. Thus we see a two-tier trust model with distributed risk.
Systems without proportional consequences do not engender trust: this is why contracts exist and are specific and clear methods to invoke financial and legal penalties for improper actions. IT sharing paradigms require trust models adapted to their environments (e.g. single company, group, etc.). The capability required to deliver trust is a system of proportional consequences for breaches of trust, both in terms of magnitude and -more importantly -timescale.
Support process tools
Do financial firms optimize their resource allocations (portfolios) by hand? After they have used their optimization tools, perhaps, but certainly not beforehand. A typical portfolio directed by a fund manager can easily run to hundreds of stocks selected according to maximizing a specific objective and limited by equally precise constraints on number of stocks to hold, position limits, cashflow obligations that must be met on specific dates, hedging against worst case scenarios, etc. The dynamic system enabled and embodied by resource sharing paradigms for a typical large company is a significant challenge for users to be able to exploit efficiently and economically. Without sophisticated tools users will find that the more potentially useful and flexible the system is the less practically usable it will be (see Figure 5) . The most scarce resource for many users is attention: they already have jobs and do not want to be bothered with unnecessary details of resource allocation systems.
The process tools for resource allocation must enable users to express their resource needs in a simple way together with the users' uncertainties about these needs over time. They should also enable resource trading (buying and selling of blocks of time and capacity) and capture the effective price dynamics of both spot and futures prices together with changing availabilities. However, the users should not be bothered by these details. Building such tools which integrate budgets and business objectives with resource allocation decisions may seem overly ambitious but it is a situation that is tackled every day for fund managers balancing opportunities and obligations over time. The technical area that these tools build from is multi-stage stochastic optimization that is generally applicable to large-scale resource systems whether the underlying resources are financial or Grid (see [Nef00, Mar59, BL97] ).
Design for value
When making a business case for the adoption of a resource sharing technology the following arguments are common: increased utilization, cost savings, greater allocation flexibility, feasibility of previously impossibly computational tasks, etc. These may be theoretically possible but to what extent can an organization practically realize these potential values?
As mentioned in the previous section on futures markets a market and resource product structures can be engineered to achieve results: laissez-faire alone is not enough. This is especially true in cases where markets will be created for the sole purpose of achieving an efficient resource allocation internally.
Economic engineering for resource sharing covers two main areas: market design and product design. The following questions are just a small selection of the economically significant market design issues. Should the IT department of an organization be operated as a profit or as a cost center? How much reselling of resources should be allowed? Should short-selling be allowed? Is speculation permitted? What level of financial and project risk are users and departments permitted to take?
Product design is just as important as market design in practical systems. For simplicity it can be important for most of the usual user and manager needs to be available directly as products rather than having to be built each time they are needed. Spot and forward contracts (reservations) can be useful decompositions for describing and controlling the theoretical basis of value. Alternatively these can be automatically assembled to match user, application, and department requirement profiles using process tools (e.g. multistage stochastic portfolio optimization).
However markets and products are designed they need to be crafted to ensure that the maximum value is realized from the underlying resources and business context. This design capability is vital to deliver confidence to executive decision makers for implementation and subsequent improvements to their bottom line in practice.
Maturity of proposed capabilities
We qualitatively assess the maturity of the capabilities required to benefit from each of the lessons using a 5-stage framework derived from the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [Ins] . There are two differences between a typical use of CMM and our approach: (a) in practice CMM analysis often focuses on the capabilities of a particular organization whereas we assess maturity levels in the broader field of IT sharing and (b) CMM levels typically refer to the maturity of software development processes whereas we focus on the maturity of IT sharing processes/capabilities derived from our 10 lessons. We therefore need to redefine these levels for the context of this chapter. CMM defines five levels which we adopt, label and (re-)define below: Initial; Repeatable; Defined; Managed; Optimizing.
1. Initial: basic elements of the capability have been observed in practice 2. Repeatable: it is possible to reliably repeat the implementation of the capability, and there is a common body of work supporting the understanding of the capability 3. Defined: there is a defined process for implementing the capability and industry standards exist 4. Managed: the processes of implementing and maintaining the capability can be managed in terms of time-varying desired objectives and requirements 5. Optimizing: the processes of implementing and maintaining the capability can be continuously optimized in terms of the desired objectives and requirements
Our assessment is given in Table 2 . We will give brief comments on each of the capability assessments but not an in depth review, this would be beyond the scope of the current chapter.
Avoid the tragedy of the commons Congestion of commonly accessible resources is well recognized and current Grid and cycle-harvesting software has support for increasingly sophisticated policies covering resource usage. However there is still very little support for policy design in terms of desired outcome versus stochastic demand models (which are also not supported) In this sense sharing software is well behind, say, network design tools.
Discover and communicate dynamic value
Price discovery mechanisms are almost absent from the IT resource sharing space. Whilst top-down allocation is possible via policies the ability for users to express their urgency and for systems to provide real-time feedback has only been seen in some research demonstrations.
Use real money The authors are aware of only a very small number of resource sharing systems where resource usage (or reservation) is directly tied to accounting systems but this is a long way from common practice. Selling resources for money, e.g. supercomputer time is a well established practice, as is monitor-and-bill for variablypriced outsourcing contracts. This knowledge and practice is not yet integrated into resource sharing software.
Guarantee property rights Guaranteed QoS for allocated resources is present on very few systems, mostly mainframes and supercomputers (where this is provided in the operating systems or alternatively provided at a machine-level granularity). Policy based systems can generally support a basic version of property rights for certain privileged users. Management of rights in order to achieve objectives is largely absent.
Use futures markets The first operational futures market in computer time was a manual system in 1968 [Sut68] but little has been implemented in practice since then apart from certain research demonstrations. There is some understanding of how to run futures markets for IT resources but this is far from common practice.
Create incentives The incentive structure around resource sharing is, in our view, a meta-capability in that it is implemented based on the careful design of a business model. Incentives are not inherent in software/system mechanisms as the many hundreds of failed business-to-business and business-to-consumer auction sites demonstrated in the dotcom era.
Ensure trust In a commercial environment trust is based on legal and financial consequences: both immediate (penalties) and deferred (reputation, litigation). Whilst there is a body of work around reputation in agent economies this has yet to be applied to resource sharing except in some limited P2P examples. There is no equivalent of the real time risk adjusted margin accounting of financial exchanges (see section 2.8).
Support process tools The need for user friendly interfaces is well understood in all IT sharing paradigms with a range of answers from portals to dedicated software. However the process tools contained in the interfaces are generally limited, especially in terms of achieving business objectives.
Design for value Both IT professional and financial experts understand the need to design systems to achieve financial goals and there are some, generally proprietary, tools to assess the return on investment from installation of different IT sharing technologies. However there is no generally accepted process for this assessment and certainly no tools available for designing how a sharing systems system should run in terms of financial objectives.
Conclusion
From our analysis of IT sharing software and systems in Table 2 it is clear that there is a large gap between current practice and the potential for value in this area. By value we mean the realization of the potential business benefits from efficient use and dynamic allocation of resources. The biggest gaps are around the quantification of the value and designing systems so that maximum value is achieved in practice. That both are missing together is not surprising: it is hard to maximize value if you have no means of making it visible and quantifying it. Thus the lowest hanging fruit is in making value visible to users and allowing users to express their urgency back. Once value can be seen then it can be maximized and the other lessons about design (i.e. use of reservations) and the use of real money can be applied in a meaningful way, assuming that a viable incentive structure is in place. Past developments in the IT resource sharing field have been mostly technology-driven and in those cases where needs were the driving force, it has been mostly the needs of scientists (Grids) or home users (P2P). This modus operandi has produced a plethora of inventive sharing mechanisms but corporate IS managers still do not know how their organizations can derive value from these technologies. This should not come as a surprise, resource sharing mechanisms per se are indeed of little business value in the absence of tools that will assist companies with the implementation of a suitable sharing strategy. It is at this business level that action must start, not in technicalities that can only provide facilitation.
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